THE GREATEST FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE ECONOMIC THEORIES by Aurelia Ioana Logojan
Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
 
7 
THE GREATEST FINANCIAL CRISES  







The financial crisis erupted in 2007 caused disruptions on the others markets and then was 
followed by economic recession. This article present the explanations provided by economic theories 
about the main consequences of the greatest financial crises on the economy, form XIX century till 
today. The conclusion of the paper is that the main changes in the economic theory should be about 
the role of human and a more ethical view of economy. 
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Introduction: 
Some financial crises have little effect outside of the financial sector, but other 
crises,  like  the  crisis  form  1819 1825,  1873,  1929  and  2008  had  recessionary  or 
depressionary effect on the rest of the economy In this paper I tried to present the 
main theories about the financial crisis and their aftermaths.  
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007, continues in 2009 and likely continues 
longer, is in need for explanation by economic theory. The monetary authorities and 
financial regulators provide us with a series of explanations and measures but there is 
a lack of overview. The lack of convincing theory and strategy becomes especially 
worrying when we see the crisis affecting the real economy. Since the financial crisis 
turn into economic recession, there is little guidance from economic theory on how 
to solve it. This crisis provides a test on existing theories and allows us to identify 
which theories are relevant and which are not. 
 
The main financial crisis and their aftermath over the economy  
The greatest financial crisis and their consequences on the economy raised the 
problem  of  the  viability  of  economic  theories.  The  search  for  causes  is  closely 
connected to the question of how to avoid a future depression. The even larger 
question is whether it was largely a failure on the part of free markets or largely a 
failure on the part of government efforts to regulate interest rates, curtail widespread 
bank  failures,  and  control  the  money  supply.  The  answer  of  this  question  is  a 
debateble one, those who believe in a large role for the state in the economy believe 
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it was mostly a failure of the free markets and those who believe in free markets 
believe it was mostly a failure of government that compounded the problem. 
Current economic theories may be broadly classified into three main points of 
view. First, there is orthodox classical economics: monetarist, Austrian Economics 
and neoclassical economic theory, which focus on the macroeconomic effects of 
money  supply,  how  central  banking  decisions  lead  to  overinvestment  (economic 
bubble),  or  the  supply  of  gold  which  backed  many  currencies  before  the  Great 
Depression, including production and consumption. 
Second,  there  are  structural  theories,  most  importantly  Keynesian,  but  also 
including  those  of  institutional  economics,  that point  to  under  consumption  and 
overinvestment  (economic  bubble),  malfeasance  by  bankers  and  industrialists,  or 
incompetence by government officials. The only consensus viewpoint is that there 
was a large scale lack of confidence. Unfortunately, once panic and deflation set in, 
many people believed they could make more money by keeping clear of the markets 
as  prices  got  lower  and lower  and  a  given  amount  of  money  bought  ever  more 
goods. 
Third, there is the Marxist critique of political economy. This emphasizes the 
tendency of capitalism to create unbalanced accumulations of wealth, leading to over 
accumulations of capital and a repeating cycle of devaluations through economic 
crises.  Marx  saw  recession  and  depression  as  unavoidable  under  free market 
capitalism as there are no restrictions on accumulations of capital other than the 
market itself. 
 
The first major financial crisis 1819 1825  
The first major financial crisis, started in 1819 in the United States, had occurred 
after the nation faced a depression in the late 1780s, and another severe economic 
downturn  in  the  late  1790s  following  the  Panic  of  1797.  In  those  earlier  crises, 
however, the primary cause of economic turmoil originated in the broader Atlantic 
economy. In contrast, the causes of the Panic of 1819 largely originated within the 
U.S.  economy.  The  resulting  crisis  caused  widespread  foreclosures,  bank  failures, 
unemployment, and a slump in agriculture and manufacturing.  
In the same period, european demand for american foodstuffs was decreased 
because agriculture in Europe was recovering from the Napoleonic Wars, which had 
decimated European agriculture. War and revolution in the New World destroyed 
the supply line of precious metals from Mexico and Peru to Europe. Without the 
base of the international money supply, europeans needed all the available specie. 
This  caused  American  bankers  and  businessmen  to  start  issuing  banknotes  and 
expand credit and by the end of 1819, the banks would call these loans . American 
bankers, who had little experience with corporate charters, promissory notes, bills of 
exchange, or stocks and bonds, encouraged the speculation boom during the first 
years  of  the  market  revolution.  From  1825,  because  the  evolution  of  european 
economy, of northen american and latin american countries and it was triggered the 
British crisis, which become on of the greatest international crisis. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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Different  economists  have  offered  explanations  for  the  Panic  of  1819. 
Keynesian economist suggest that the Panic of 1819 was the early Republic's first 
experience with the boom bust cycles common to all modern economies, but this 
view could be not complete, this panic seems to be more complex. It was a failure of 
the banking system following the War of 1812 and combined with the issue of the 
depression and over speculation, it became the first failure of the market economy in 
America. The Panic of 1819 marked the beginning of a new phase of American 
economic  history,  where  mature  market  institutions  would  continue  to  move 
cyclically from boom to bust.  
Austrian school economists view the nationwide recession that resulted from 
the  Panic  of  1819  as  the  first  failure  of  expansionary  monetary  policy.  This 
explanation  is  based  on  the  Austrian  theory  of  the  business  cycle.  Government 
borrowed heavily to finance the War of 1812, which caused serious strain on the 
banks’ reserves of specie and led to a suspension of specie payments in 1814. The 
suspension of the obligation to redeem spurred the establishment of new banks and 
the expansion of bank note issues. This inflation of money encouraged unsustainable 
investments to take place. It soon became clear the monetary situation was bad, and 
the Second Bank of the United States was forced to call a halt to its expansion and 
launch a painful process of contraction. There was a wave of bankruptcies, bank 
failures, and bank runs; prices dropped and wide scale urban unemployment began.  
 
The financial crisis form 1873 
The  Long  Depression  started  after  the  financial  crisis  of  1873  and  it  was 
considered,  a  long  time,  a  worldwide  economic  crisis  though  there  is  some 
controversy over whether it should be labeled a depression or recession. The Long 
Depression, labeled The Great Depression (until the Depression of 1930s), was felt 
most heavily in Europe and the United States, which had been experiencing strong 
economic growth fueled by the Second Industrial Revolution and by the american 
civil war. It is often considered that United Kingdom have been the hardest hit and 
during this period it lost some of its large industrial lead over the economies of 
Continental Europe 
In the United States, the Long Depression began with the Panic of 1873 and the 
causes of the this depression are debated, mainly because it was not a production 
depression; it was a price depression. The most immediate cause, and the date that is 
often used as the start of the Depression, was the collapse of the Vienna Stock 
Exchange on May 9, 1873. Others have argued the depression was rooted in the 
1870 Franco Prussian War and the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871), that forced French to 
make large war reparations payments to Germany. The primary cause of the price 
depression in the United States was the tight monetary policy that the U.S. followed 
to get back to the gold standard after the Civil War. The U.S. was taking money out 
of  circulation  to  achieve  this  goal,  therefore,  there  was  less  available  money  to 
facilitate trade. Because of the monetary policy described above the price of silver 
started to fall causing considerable losses of asset values, however, by most accounts, The greatest financial crises and the economic theories 
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after  1879  production  was  growing,  thus  further  putting  downward  pressure  on 
prices due to increased industrial productivity, trade and competition. 
In America the speculative nature of financing due to both the greenback which 
was specie issued to pay for the US Civil War and fraud in the building of the Union 
Pacific Railway up to 1869. Railway overbuilding and weak markets collapsed the 
bubble in 1873 in USA and in UK.  
Because of the Panic of 1873, governments depegged their currencies, to save 
money.  The  demonetization  of  silver  by  European  and  North  American 
governments in the early 1870s was certainly a contributing factor. The Coinage Act 
of  1873  in  America  was  met  with  great  opposition  but  were  Americans  who 
advocated the continuance of government issued fiat money to avoid deflation and 
promote exports. The resumption of the US government buying silver was enacted 
in 1890 with the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. 
Some  economic  historians  argue  that  the  Long  Depression  was  actually  a 
deflationary period but not a time of falling production and GDP. The deflation 
thesis has led to the claim that the Long Depression was not truly a depression at all 
because production and real GDP grew throughout the period. The confusion comes 
from the fact that prices were falling (hence, deflation) because of greater industrial 
productivity and the presence of sound money (gold and silver). 
In  the  modern  view,  the  Long  Depression  was  actually  a  period  of  great 
economic growth, but that many Americans at the time were confused because of 
falling  prices  and  increasing  income  inequality,  as  the  living  standards  of  the 
wealthiest Americans were increasing at an even faster rate.  
Monetarists believe that the 1873 depression was caused by shortages of gold 
that undermined the gold standard, and that the 1848 California Gold Rush. Other 
analyses have pointed to developmental surges, theorizing that the Second Industrial 
Revolution  was  causing  large  shifts  in  the  economies  of  many  states,  imposing 
transition costs, which may also have played a role in causing the depression. 
 
The Great Depression  
The Great Depression, originated in United States was a worldwide economic 
downturn starting in most places in 1929, after the stock market crashed of October 
29 and ending at different times in the 1930s or early 1940s for different countries. It 
was the largest and most severe economic depression in the 20th century, and is used 
in the 21st century as an example of how far the world's economy can decline. The 
depression  had  devastating  effects  in  virtually  every  country,  international  trade 
plunged by half to two thirds, as did personal income, tax revenue. 
There  were  multiple  causes  for  the  first  downturn  in  1929,  including  the 
structural weaknesses and specific events that turned it into a major depression and 
the way in which the downturn spread from country to country. The causes of the 
crisis are considered to be structural factors like massive bank failures and the stock 
market crash, but other opinions had pointed to the Britain's decision to return to 
the Gold Standard at pre World War I parities. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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During the Great Depression, Keynes had published his most important work, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Keynes argued in his 
work that lower aggregate expenditures in the economy contributed to a massive 
decline  in  income  and  to  employment  that  was  well  below  the  average.  In  this 
situation,  the  economy  might  have  reached  a  perfect  balance,  at  a  cost  of  high 
unemployment. The basic basic idea of his theory was simple: to keep people fully 
employed, governments have to run deficits when the economy is slowing because 
the  private  sector will  not  invest  enough  to  increase  production  and  reverse  the 
recession. Keynesian economists called on governments during times of economic 
crisis to increase government spending and/or cutting taxes increasing individuals' 
incomes. As incomes increased, they would spend more. As they spent more, the 
multiplier  effect  would  take  over  and  expand  the  effect  on  the  initial  spending. 
Keynesian economists assumed poor people would spend new incomes; however, 
they saved much of the new money; that is, they paid back debts. Keynesian ideas of 
the consumption function were upset in the 1950s by Milton Friedman and Franco 
Modigliani.  
Monetarists, including Milton Friedman
1 argue that the Great Depression was 
caused  by  monetary  contraction,  the  consequence  of  poor  policymaking  by  the 
American Federal Reserve System and continuous crisis in the banking system. In 
this view, the Federal Reserve, by not acting, allowed the money supply as measured 
by the M2 to shrink by one third from 1929 to 1933. Friedman argued that the 
downward turn in the economy, starting with the stock market crash, would have 
been just another recession. The problem was that some large, public bank failures, 
particularly that of the New York Bank of the United States, produced panic and 
widespread runs on local banks, and that the Federal Reserve sat idly by while banks 
fell. He claimed that, if the Fed had provided emergency lending to these key banks, 
or simply bought government bonds on the open market to provide liquidity and 
increase the quantity of money after the key banks fell, all the rest of the banks would 
not have fallen after the large ones did, and the money supply would not have fallen 
as far and as fast as it did. With significantly less money to go around, businessmen 
could not get new loans and could not even get their old loans renewed, forcing 
many to stop investing. This interpretation blames the Federal Reserve for inaction, 
especially the New York branch. One reason why the Federal Reserve did not act to 
limit the decline of the money supply was regulation. At that time the amount of 
credit the Federal Reserve could issue was limited by laws which required partial gold 
backing of that credit. By the late 1920s the Federal Reserve had almost hit the limit 
of allowable credit that could be backed by the gold in its possession. This credit was 
in the form of Federal Reserve demand notes. During the bank panics a portion of 
those  demand  notes  were  redeemed  for  Federal  Reserve  gold.  Since  the  Federal 
Reserve had hit its limit on allowable credit, any reduction in gold in its vaults had to 
be accompanied by a greater reduction in credit.  
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Recent  work  from  a  neoclassical  perspective  focuses  on  the  decline  in 
productivity that caused the initial decline in output and a prolonged recovery due to 
policies that affected the labor market. This work, collected by Kehoe and Prescott
2, 
decomposes the economic decline into a decline in the labor force, capital stock, and 
the productivity with which these inputs are used. This study suggests that theories 
of the Great Depression have to explain an initial severe decline but rapid recovery in 
productivity, relatively little change in the capital stock, and a prolonged depression 
in the labor force. This analysis rejects theories that focus on the role of savings and 
posit a decline in the capital stock. 
Another explanation comes from the Austrian School of economics. Theorists 
of the "Austrian School" who wrote about the Great Depression include Austrian 
economist Friedrich Hayek and American economist Murray Rothbard
3, who wrote 
America's Great Depression (1963). In their view and like the monetarists, the Federal 
Reserve, which was created in 1913, shoulders much of the blame; but in opposition 
to  the  monetarists,  they  argue  that  the  key  cause  of  the  Depression  was  the 
expansion of the money supply in the 1920s that led to an unsustainable credit 
driven boom. 
One reason for the monetary inflation was to help Great Britain, which, in the 
1920s, was struggling with its plans to return to the gold standard at pre war parity. 
Returning to the gold standard at this rate meant that the British economy was facing 
deflationary pressure. According to Rothbard, the lack of price flexibility in Britain 
meant that unemployment shot up, and the american government was asked to help. 
The United States was receiving a net inflow of gold, and inflated further in order to 
help Britain return to the gold standard. Rothbard says American inflation was meant 
to allow Britain to inflate as well, because under the gold standard, Britain could not 
inflate on its own. In the Austrian view it was this inflation of the money supply that 
led to an unsustainable boom in both asset prices (stocks and bonds) and capital 
goods. By the time the Fed belatedly tightened in 1928, it was far too late and, in the 
Austrian view, a depression was inevitable. 
According  to  the Austrians,  the  artificial  interference  in  the  economy was  a 
disaster prior to the Depression, and government efforts to prop up the economy 
after the crash of 1929 only made things worse. According to Rothbard, government 
intervention  delayed  the  market's  adjustment  and  made  the  road  to  complete 
recovery  more  difficult.  Furthermore,  Rothbard  criticizes  Milton  Friedman's 
assertion that the central bank failed to inflate the supply of money. Rothbard asserts 
that the Federal Reserve couldn’t do his job because the lost of faith in banking 
system of American population and their preference for cash. The potential for a run 
on  the  banks  caused  local  bankers  to  be  more  conservative  in  lending  out  their 
reserves, and this, Rothbard argues, was the cause of the Federal Reserve's inability 
to inflate.  
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Two economists of the 1920s, Waddill Catchings and William Trufant Foster
4, 
popularized  a  theory  which  states  held  the  economy  produced  more  than  it 
consumed, because the consumers did not have enough income. Thus the unequal 
distribution of wealth throughout the 1920s caused the Great Depression. According 
to this view, wages increased at a rate lower than productivity increases. Most of the 
benefit of the increased productivity went into profits, which went into the stock 
market bubble rather than into consumer purchases. Say's law no longer operated in 
this model (an idea picked up by Keynes). As long as corporations had continued to 
expand  their  capital  facilities,  the  economy  had  flourished.  Under  pressure  from 
administration of that time and from business, the Federal Reserve Board kept the 
discount rate low, encouraging high (and excessive) investment. By the end of the 
1920s, however, capital investments had created more plant space than could be 
profitably used, and factories were producing more than consumers could purchase. 
According to this view, the root cause of the Great  
Depression was a global overinvestment in heavy industry capacity compared to 
wages and earnings from independent businesses, such as farms. The solution was 
the  government  must  pump  money  into  consumers'  pockets.  That  is,  it  must 
redistribute purchasing power, maintain the industrial base, but reinflate prices and 
wages  to  force  as  much  of  the  inflationary  increase  in  purchasing  power  into 
consumer spending. The economy was overbuilt, and new factories were not needed.  
Irving  Fisher
5  argued  that  the  predominant  factor  leading  to  the  Great 
Depression was  overindebtedness  and  deflation. Fisher  tied  loose  credit  to  over 
indebtedness,  which  fueled  speculation  and  asset  bubbles.  He  outlined  9  factors 
interacting with one another under conditions of debt and deflation to create the 
mechanics of boom to bust: debt liquidation and distress selling, contraction of the 
money supply as bank loans are paid off, a fall in the level of asset prices, a still 
greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies, a fall in profits, a 
reduction in output, in trade and in employment, pessimism and loss of confidence, 
hoarding of money, a fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted 
interest rates.  
Many economists have argued that the worsen of depression was due to the 
sharp  decline  in  international  trade  after  1930  helped  to,  especially  for  countries 
significantly  dependent  on  foreign  trade.  Most  historians  and  economists  partly 
blame  the  American  Smoot Hawley  Tariff  Act  for  worsening  the  depression  by 
seriously reducing international trade and causing retaliatory tariffs in other countries.  
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The financial crisis of 2008 
The prezent financial crisis, started in 2007 has been called the most serious 
financial crisis since the Great Depression, with its global effects characterized by the 
failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in the trillions of 
U.S.  dollars,  substantial  financial  commitments  incurred  by  governments,  and  a 
significant decline in economic activity. 
The immediate cause of the crisis was the bursting of the United States housing 
bubble which peaked in approximately 2005–2006. High default rates on "subprime" 
and  adjustable  rate  mortgages  (ARM),  began  to  increase  quickly  thereafter.  An 
increase in loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long term trend of rising 
housing prices had encouraged borrowers to assume difficult mortgages in the belief 
they would be able to quickly refinance at more favorable terms. However, once 
interest rates began to rise and housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–
2007 in many parts of the U.S., refinancing became more difficult. Defaults and 
foreclosure activity increased dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices 
failed to go up as anticipated, and ARM interest rates reset higher. 
From 2007, significant amounts of foreign money flowed into the U.S. from 
fast growing economies in Asia and oil producing countries. This inflow of funds 
combined with low U.S. interest rates from 2002 2004 contributed to easy credit 
conditions, which fueled both housing and credit bubbles. Loans of various types 
were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt load.
 As part of 
the housing and credit booms, the amount of financial agreements called mortgage 
backed  securities  (MBS),  which  derive  their  value  from  mortgage  payments  and 
housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and 
investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices 
declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in 
subprime  MBS  reported  significant  losses.  Falling  prices  also  resulted  in  homes 
worth  less  than  the  mortgage  loan,  providing  a  financial  incentive  to  enter 
foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. 
continues  to  drain  wealth  from  consumers  and  erodes  the  financial  strength  of 
banking  institutions.  Defaults  and  losses  on  other  loan  types  also  increased 
significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the 
economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally. 
While  the  housing  and  credit  bubbles  built,  a  series  of  factors  caused  the 
financial system to both expand and become increasingly fragile. Policymakers did 
not recognize the increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as 
investment banks and hedge funds. These institutions as well as certain regulated 
banks had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the loans described 
above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan defaults or 
MBS  losses.  These  losses  impacted  the  ability  of  financial  institutions  to  lend, 
slowing economic activity. During September 2008, the crisis hits its most critical 
stage. There was the equivalent of a bank run on the money market mutual funds, 
which frequently invest in commercial paper issued by corporations to fund their Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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operations and payrolls. Withdrawal from money markets were $144.5 billion during 
one  week,  versus  $7.1  billion  the  week  prior.  This  interrupted  the  ability  of 
corporations to rollover (replace) their short term debt.  
The crisis rapidly developed and spread into a global economic shock, resulting 
in a number of European bank failures, declines in various stock indexes, and large 
reductions  in  the  market  value  of  equities
  and  commodities.
  Moreover,  the  de 
leveraging of financial institutions, as assets were sold to pay back obligations that 
could not be refinanced in frozen credit markets, further accelerated the liquidity 
crisis and caused a decrease in international trade. 
It seems to that the economic theory was not enough to describe and to prevent 
the present crisis. Although the economists have proposed as solutions to strengthen 
the regulations and enlarge supervision to avoid the futures financial crisis, I don’t 
thing it is the correct solution. In my view it is necessary to rethink the role of the 
human in the economic theories and to propose a ethical concept of economy could 
mitigate the cyclical greatest financial crisis. I think that investors will always find the 
ways  to  escape  form  the  regulation  and  it  is  necessary  to  requires  a  general 
economical ethical cod.  
 
Conclusion 
The implicit view behind standard models is that markets and economies are 
inherently stable and that they only temporarily get off track but this view failed to 
warn policy makers about the threatening system crisis. As the crisis has unfolded, 
economists had to abandon their standard models. In this period the common sense 
advice is a poor substitute for an underlying model that can provide much needed 
guidance for developing policy and regulation.  
Although  it  could  be  seen  as  a  failure  of  popular  models,  I  think  the  real 
problem is the lack of historical memory, the greatest financial crisis (from 1825, 
1873, 1929 and 2008) have had the the same main features along the time despite 
their particular features. If we try the visualize the economic history we can see the 
real problem   the human greed. The main problem is not just the economic theory 
but a continuous human desire to have more than it needs which allows speculations 
and thieves. The solution in my vision is a more ethical and moral way to conceive 
the function of economy.  
 
References 
Alan H. Gleason. 1959. Foster and Catchings: A Reappraisal, Journal of Political 
Economy  
Barry Eichengreen, Michael Bordo – Crisis now and then: What lessons form the last 
era of financial globalisation, National Bureau of Economic Research, nov. 2001 
Barry Eichengreen – The Global Credit Crisis as History, University of California, 
Berkeley, dec.2008 
Irving Fisher.1933. The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depresion , Federal Bank of 
Saint Louis  The greatest financial crises and the economic theories 
 
16 
John Maynard Keynes.1935. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
Harcourt,  Brace  and  Company,  and  printed  in  the  U.S.A.  by  the  Polygraphic 
Company of America, New York 
Kehoe, Timothy J. and Edward C. Prescott.2007. Great Depressions of the Twentieth 
Century. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis  
Larry Neal, Marc Wiedenmier.2003. Crises in the Global Economy form tulips to today. 
Contagion  and  Consequences,  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  chapter  10    
Globalisation in historical perspective. 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz.1971. A Monetary History of the United States, 
1867 1960. Princeton University Press 
Martin Neil Baily, Rober Litan, Matthew Johnson.2008. The origins of the financial 
crisis. Fixing Finance Series, paper 3 
Murray Rothbard.2000. America’s Great Depression. Mises Institute. 5th edition. 
Nathaniel Frank, Brenda Gonzales Hermosillo, Hieko Hesse.2008. Transmission 
of the liquidity shocks. Evidence from the 2007 subprime crisis. International Monetary Fund, 
working paper 08/200  
 
 